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University of California-San Diego
When counterfactual questions are posed too far from the data, statistical inference
can become highly dependent on seemingly trivial but indefensible modeling as-
sumptions. Choosing one or only a few speciﬁcations to publish in the presence of
model dependence makes conclusions largely nonempirical and subject to criticism
from others who make different choices and ﬁnd contradictory results. Until now,
only relatively narrow attempts to assess model dependence have been used in the
literature (such as trying a few different functional form speciﬁcations) and, as a
result, many published inferences are far more uncertain than standard errors and
conﬁdence intervals indicate. When researchers ignore the uncertainty due to
model dependence, scholarly works tend to have the ﬂavor of merely showing that
it is possible to ﬁnd results consistent with ex ante hypotheses, rather than dem-
onstrating their veracity. Consequently, the opportunities for researchers to use
methods such as the ones we offer to learn new facts about existing studies and
avoid problems in their research are considerable.
Although the comments contain a diversity of views, we are gratiﬁed to see that
all three endorse our central message. Morrow: ‘‘It is important to know when
counterfactual statements drawn from statistical estimates wander far from the data
used in estimates.’’ Schrodt: ‘‘I am not contesting the general cautions made by the
authors: models with different functional forms can diverge substantially, predic-
tions made for sets of independent variables similar in value to those used to
estimate a model are more likely to be accurate than predictions for more distant
values, and speciﬁcation error can really mess up regression models.’’ Sambanis
and Doyle (S&D): ‘‘statistical results should not be taken too far [from the data] and
. . . any extrapolation depends on the model.’’
On some other issues, the reviewers disagree with each other or with us. For-
tunately, most of the disagreements are based on well-posed mathematical ques-
tions that can be cleanly resolved with easily provable answers, without the need for
philosophical interpretation and lengthy debate. We appreciate this opportunity to
resolve these issues in the same volume where our work originally appears, thank
the reviewers for their time, effort, and thoughtful comments, and point out to
readers who may desire further information that the mathematical proofs under-
lying our methods appear in a technical companion article (King and Zeng 2006a),
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International Studies Quarterly (2007) 51, 231–241easy-to-use software is available to implement all the methods discussed herein
(Stoll, King, and Zeng 2006), and replication data sets are available for our original
article and this response (King and Zeng 2006b, 2006c).
Our article proposed three innovations. First, we introduced a method based on
the convex hull concept for distinguishing extrapolations from interpolations. A
wide range of statistics and methods literatures recognize that extrapolation is
generally more hazardous, and produces more model-dependent inferences, than
interpolations, although technical limitations in convex hull algorithms have pre-
vented application of these ideas to data sets with more than a few variables. The
algorithm we developed makes the computation feasible for the larger numbers of
variables common in political science. Second, we prove mathematically for the ﬁrst
time what was understood only intuitively before, that the greater the distance from
a counterfactual to the available data, the more model-dependent inferences can be
about that counterfactual. We also recommended that the Gower distance (and
geometric variability threshold) be used in combination with our convex hull test to
compute measures of how much data is nearby a counterfactual of interest. The
importance of these tests lies in their ability to indicate the likelihood of model
dependence without having to run any alternative models, and so they are much
more broadly applicable, powerful, and easy to use than standard sensitivity testing.
Finally, we offer a new four-part decomposition of the potential biases affecting
causal inference, which generalizes that of Heckman et al. (1998), to include and
highlight problems more common in political science, and especially prevalent and
misunderstood in IR and comparative research. This decomposition helps convey
some of the pitfalls of counterfactual inference in causal effect estimation, and
would be useful for teaching too.
We now discuss the main issues that have arisen in the comments.
Morrow on Theory
Whereas the methods introduced in our article attempt to answer the question
‘‘when can history be our guide?,’’ James Morrow emphasizes that theory can be a
guide, too. We agree with Morrow’s point, which is especially crucial when theo-
retical information is available and empirical information is not. Our point is merely
that researchers should not be hoodwinked into thinking that their conclusions are
based on historical evidence when in fact they are based only on (sometimes un-
stated, undefended, or unjustiﬁable) theory. We add to Morrow’s collection of ﬁc-
tional law enforcement ofﬁcers Sherlock Holmes, who said ‘‘It is a capital mistake to
theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment’’ (Doyle 1888:30).
The methods we offer help ensure that your judgments are based on evidence.
Although the role of theory does not apply directly to the validity of our tests,
conditional as they are on the choice of explanatory variables and counterfactual
questions, Morrow’s general concern about theory remains an excellent one. We
thus take his lead and address the issue in a broader context.
Suppose you learn, with our methods or others, that your counterfactual ques-
tion is far enough from your data so that your conclusions will be model dependent.
What is a political scientist to do? This question has ﬁve possible answers: (1) Live
with the uncertainties that result from model dependence and convey them to
readers. (2) Obtain more observations on the same explanatory variables for values
closer to the counterfactual, a valuable strategy but not always feasible. (3) Develop
a theory to choose among the alternative models that would otherwise lead to
model-dependent conclusions. Few theories derive specific functional forms from
unassailable principles, and so this is only occasionally practical (see Signorino
1999). In applying this strategy, we must avoid theories with assumptions chosen
based on convenience rather than knowledge (and where ‘‘I derived it from
theory’’ means ‘‘I made it up’’)Fa useful simplifying device for exploration but
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observable implications, or ‘‘novel hypotheses’’ in Morrow’s terminology, that are
closer to the counterfactual. This is a valuable strategy in most research, even when
a counterfactual question has sufﬁcient supporting evidence. (5) Substitute the
counterfactual question for one closer to the available data and still of some the-
oretical interest.
Finally, Morrow recalls his college friend theorizing about what ‘‘the universe
[and his car] would look like if the speed of light was 30 miles per hour,’’ a ‘‘coun-
terfactual that has no empirical basis whatsoever and would fail King and Zeng’s
tests spectacularly.’’ Despite an extrapolation from 670 million miles per hour,
Morrow says this counterfactual had credibility because it relied on the well-sup-
ported theory of general relativity.
1 But as Morrow also recognizes, even good
theories need empirical validation. As it happens, although it took scientists con-
siderable efforts, in 1999, Lene Hau ﬁnally did succeed in slowing the speed of light
in her laboratory to just 38 miles per hour, and eventually stopped it altogether
(Hau et al. 1999). We do not know whether the considerable body of empirical work
that resulted from this research has yet conﬁrmed what a certain MG-B sports car
would look like in this light, but we do have a recommended speaker for Morrow’s
next college reunion!
Schrodt on Dinos
We appreciate Phil Schrodt’s ‘‘enthusiastic’’ anonymous review. However, his en-
tertaining and critical comment here is even more useful, even though, as we
demonstrate, each of its six points turn out to be false. The critique offers us the
opportunity to highlight and correct the honest misunderstanding underlying each
of its false claims, which should prove highly valuable in helping other researchers
avoid making these same mistakes. Although the exposition of our work is much
improved when supplemented by these clariﬁcations, the accuracy, scope, and
originality of the claims we offered are as originally summarized in our article and
proven mathematically in King and Zeng (2006a).
First, Schrodt claims that post-treatment bias is ‘‘more conventionally known as
endogeneity or simultaneity’’ and that techniques like ‘‘instrumental variables and
simultaneous equation models’’ address the problem. These claims are incorrect.
Endogeneity (or simultaneity) bias results when the designated dependent variable
actually causes the designated explanatory variable, but the analysis assumes only
the reverse is true. In contrast, post-treatment bias says nothing about the de-
pendent variable and refers only to the bias due to controlling for variables partially
caused by the key causal (or ‘‘treatment’’) variable. Thus, an analysis may have no
endogeneity bias but still high levels of post-treatment bias. For example, suppose
the key explanatory variable is employment status and the dependent variable
indicates whether an individual votes. As unemployed people may be busy ﬁnding
jobs, unemployment may cause voter turnout to drop. Suppose also that the data
include black factory workers in the 1960s American South whose employer
threatened to ﬁre anyone caught showing up at the polls. Then voting would be a
cause of employment status as well, and running a single equation model with
turnout as the dependent variable would result in endogeneity bias. Now suppose
none of our respondents worked for the racist employer and turnout decisions do
not cause employment. If we also controlled for reported intention to vote from a
poll held the day before the election, endogeneity bias would not be a problem, but
we would be left with posttreatment bias, as this variable is in large part a
1 In fact, a light speed of 30 miles per hour is an incredible stretch of general relativity theory in the weak
gravitational ﬁeld of the Earth (and even near the Sun, which is about 300,000 times heavier, Einstein 1920:88–89.)
However, it is indeed allowed under the theory and empirically credible if we let light travel (and have Morrow’s
friend drive) through certain exotic refractive media.
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intentions would incorrectly control away most of what should be attributed to the
causal effect of employment status. Our paper shows that posttreatment bias is a
particularly serious problem in IR, and avoiding or treating endogeneity has no
necessary effect on posttreatment bias. The problem of posttreatment bias is old,
but widespread recognition of it is much more recent.
2
Second, Schrodt claims ‘‘we already have a perfectly good measure that accom-
plishes what the Gower distance supposedly accomplishes and more: the variance
of the error of the prediction at a specific point . . ..’’ This claim is wrong. The issue
at hand is assessing model dependence, and Schrodt would have us use a measure
that is dependent on the veracity of the assumed regression model. In contrast, the
Gower distance and convex hull measures make no modeling assumptions. The
variance calculation, detailed in the two algebraic equations displayed prominently
in his paper, is valid only ‘‘under the usual regression assumptions.’’ These mea-
sures have indeed been ‘‘available for decades,’’ and what they mean has been
‘‘known for decades,’’ but they (and their statistical properties) require the as-
sumption that the linear regression model holds exactly, so they are useless for
assessing model dependence. See King and Zeng (2006a:2) for an example.
Third, Schrodt claims that the Gower distance ‘‘applies only to ratio data, the
most restrictive category of measurement.’’ This claim is wrong. Ratio-level mea-
surement is unnecessary, as Gower distance does not require division but only
normalization by range, which works even for nominal data.
3 Indeed, the advan-
tage of the Gower distance measure is that it works for variables from any level of
measurement (Gower 1971) that makes sense as explanatory variables in a statistical
model, and so it does indeed apply to ‘‘almost all statistical models used and the-
oretical processes hypothesized in the discipline.’’ For example, a multinomial
variable like religion with J categories can be included in the model by using J   1
indicators, as is taught in all our basic regression classes. But once this is done,
Gower’s formula applies directly. If the coding makes sense for an explanatory
variable in any chosen statistical model, the distance of a counterfactual from the
data used in this model can be measured by the Gower distance. No new assump-
tions or codings are required.
Fourth, Schrodt claims that ‘‘the right graph in [our] Figure 4 . . . involves re-
versing all of the instances of a key variable’’ and is therefore ‘‘nonsensical.’’ This
claim is false. The ﬁgure was based on 122 separate and independent counterfactual
evaluations. We presented them all together, which perhaps accounts for the con-
fusion, but reversing was done one at a time. Indeed, our methods are deﬁned only
for single-row counterfactuals. Thus, for the ﬁrst civil war in the data, we held
constant all the explanatory variables at their observed values, changed only
whether the UN intervened, and then checked this one counterfactual against the
entire (factual) data set. We then start over and evaluate a counterfactual involving
the second civil war by reversing the UN decision to intervene only in this second
civil war, leaving the rest of the data set unchanged, and so on. Imagining what
would happen if all 122 UN decisions to intervene were simultaneously reversed
would indeed be ‘‘nonsensical,’’ but that was not done.
Fifth, Schrodt claims as his novel discovery that it is possible for a point just
outside the interpolation region to be closer to a large amount of data than one
2 Despite Schrodt’s memory of taking ‘‘graduate level econometrics in the early 1970s,’’ where he says ‘‘about
half of the course dealt with this problem in various guises,’’ no discussion of this issue appeared in standard 1970s,
or even 1980s, econometrics texts or any others we have been able to ﬁnd. Most of these texts, and much of
comparative and IR research, do discuss endogeneity at length.
3 For example, two observed values of a binary x can only be either the same or different, and the corresponding
normalized Gower distance would be either 0 or 1, just as we would want. This is regardless of how the x values are
coded (any x1 and x2 would do), even if x ¼ 0 is not deﬁned, and despite the fact that division operations like x1/x2
may make no sense.
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is theoretically possible (although probably empirically infrequent) for a point just
outside the interpolation region . . . to be closer to a large amount of data than one
inside the hull that occupies a large empty region away from most of the data,’’ and
so a discovery of Schrodt’s this is not. Substantively, the exception described can
happen in only a trivially small fraction of the space. This is even true in Schrodt’s
ﬁgures, where the potential space for counterfactuals extends miles above and to
the right of the graphs at the scale he chose to draw. If we imagine re-plotting his
ﬁgures by extending both vertical and horizontal axes (to their logically possible
ranges, or for the ‘‘C’’ versions of his ﬁgures merely using the original scale of the
‘‘A’’ versions) and ‘‘zooming out’’ for a broader perspective, it is easy to see this
point and how tiny the exceptions are.
As such, we and the entire statistics community describe extrapolation as gen-
erally more difﬁcult, and model dependent, than interpolation. Although most in
the literature ignore the rare exception at issue, we introduced the Gower distance
as an additional check to detect and avoid it. With both tools, we can easily identify
this potential problem, even (to quote Schrodt) for the ‘‘few sane political scientists
[who] would ﬁt a quartic.’’
Relatedly, Schrodt claims that ‘‘the convex hull itself is dependent on outliers.’’ In
fact, like all functional form sensitivity tests, the hull test is conditional on the set of
explanatory variables chosen for analysis. Just as ﬁxing endogeneity bias will not
help posttreatment bias, ﬁxing outliers will not resolve extrapolation bias or vice
versa. ‘‘We assume outliers are removed as part of the important data preproc-
essing procedures normally used in standard statistical modeling . . .. In the inad-
visable situation where a researcher ignores the [outlier] problem and persists with
checking whether the counterfactual is outside the convex hull, outliers in X would
make this extrapolation-detection method overly conservative’’ (King and Zeng
2006a:10, fn. 10).
Finally, Schrodt questions the breadth of our claim that our procedures work ‘‘for
the class of nearly all models, whether or not they are formalized, enumerated, and
run, and for the class of all possible dependent variables.’’ In fact, the advantage of
the tests we proposed is that they give some of the same beneﬁts in detecting model
dependence as would come from running an inﬁnite number of alternative spe-
ciﬁcations. Similarly, as specifying the counterfactual, and applying our tests, do not
require the dependent variable and can even be performed before it is collected,
inferences from our procedures apply to any possible dependent variable. If our
claim sounds broad, it is only because the usual approach to sensitivity testing is so
narrow and restrictive. The point in our quote above is accurate.
4
Many of Phil Schrodt’s claimsFwhich we can imagine him summarizing as ‘‘pass
the sauce, and I’ll throw another dino on the barbie’’Fmay seem somewhat more
entertaining than enlightening, but we hope readers agree with us that the ex-
change in total has been productive and we appreciate the opportunity he has given
us to help readers avoid these same misunderstandings.
Doyle and Sambanis on Sambanis and Doyle
S&D have devoted remarkable attention to the few pages in our article replicating
one logit model from Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Their comment in this issue is
one of six papers they wrote totaling 408 pages of text, and is accompanied by an
additional 103 text, program, and data ﬁles, all devoted solely to studying the same
few pages in our article (on the web site they cite, accessed 10/11/2006).
4 Relatedly, Schrodt asks ‘‘Speciﬁcation matters . . . This is news?’’ Of course not. What is news is that our
methods can detect when a speciﬁcation change that has no visible effect on ﬁtting the data can be consequential for
counterfactual inference, without knowing which change it is and without the need to run alternative models.
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ence in practice. We addressed only this one methodological aspect of only one of
their article’s 10 listed hypotheses. We chose their analysis on UN peacebuilding
effectiveness for further study because it was the main focus of their article on
‘‘International Peacebuilding.’’ We take it from their response that it is at least
central to their work.
Their APSR article ﬁnds an apparent effect of a conglomerate measure of UN
interventions and then ‘‘unpacks’’ it into its ﬁve component measures. S&D now
believe that the one component we studied, multidimensional peacekeeping op-
erations, is ‘‘not the single solution to all peacebuilding challenges,’’ but this com-
ponent was the only one of the ﬁve with any supporting evidence. Of the ﬁve
components unpacked, they report four as having no effect: (1) UN mediation ‘‘is
insigniﬁcant and is negative,’’ (2) observer missions have an effect that is ‘‘not large
or significant,’’ (3) UN enforcement ‘‘is not significant,’’ (4) traditional peacekeep-
ing ‘‘is not at all significant . . . and even has a negative sign.’’ In contrast, mul-
tidimensional peacekeeping operations ‘‘are extremely significant and positively
associated with strict peacebuilding . . . (Notice the high odds ratio of multidimen-
sional peacekeeping operations in Model A8, Table 3)’’ (Doyle and Sambanis
2000:791).
5 Thus, although they write now that ‘‘we never offered Model A8 as the
only evidence in support of our conclusions,’’ it was the only model supportive of
their hypothesis, and so any effect of the conglomerate variable is but a reﬂection of
the effect of this one component. So we chose that model for our article and focus
on it here.
Statistical Claims
With our methods, we found that the counterfactuals from Model A8 were far from
the data. This implied that there exists plausible alternatives to Model A8 that are
not ruled out by existing theory, ﬁt in-sample data approximately the same, but
give very different predictions for the same counterfactuals and which imply dif-
ferent substantive results. Our methods do not say which alternative speciﬁcations
these are, but they were easy to ﬁnd, which is a clear conﬁrmation of the value of
our approach. (The specific alternative model we chose added to A8 an interaction
between UN intervention and war duration, a model consistent with their self-
described ‘‘interactive’’ peacebuilding theory.)
We showed that the modiﬁed and the original models could not be distinguished
on the basis of model ﬁt. S&D try to argue their model ﬁts better by only reporting
evidence maximally in favor of it. For example, they ran a procedure in Stata that
calculated fourteen measures of ﬁt, from which they report only the single measure
that gave the strongest support to their preferred hypothesis and suppressed the
rest, the majority of which do not support their argument. (The authors of the Stata
command they use emphasize that ‘‘there is no convincing evidence that selecting a
model that maximizes the value of a given measure of ﬁt results in a model that is
optimal in any [relevant] sense’’ (Long and Freese 2006:104). In fact, the bulk of
the evidence shows that the ﬁt of neither model is unambiguously better. Similarly,
they ignore the .001 p-value on the standard t-test on the interaction term in the
modiﬁed model, and instead ‘‘drop the clustering’’ to run a likelihood-ratio test to
claim that the interaction is ‘‘non-significant.’’ They also ignored the fact that ﬁve of
5 The tests they ran compared each component to all others, including no UN action, but even if they had
correctly compared each component to no UN action (only), the conclusion would be the same: of all the com-
ponents, only multidimensional peacekeeping meets their threshold for importance or statistical significance. (The
only other measure of UN interventions they found significant in the 18 models they ran is an ordinal variable,
constructed from the components. Unfortunately, the ordinal ranking is logically inconsistent given the ﬁndings
about the effects of its components. Using it as a continuous measure, as they do, confounds the problem further.)
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conclusions on all evidence, whether or not it supports your case, is not ‘‘ﬂip-
ﬂopping’’ (a term they take from political campaigns applied to politicians expected
to take the same position no matter what); it is the only appropriate scientific
procedure. In this case, the evidence indicates that there does not exist sufﬁcient
evidence to choose between the two models.
Second, S&D argue that ‘‘the two models do not produce diametrically opposed
policy implications.’’ Consider the crucial issue of determining for what type of wars
UN interventions would have maximum effect on postwar peacebuilding. Under
the original model, the UN has the largest effect in shorter duration wars, a pattern
statistically significant for all wars. Under the modiﬁed model, the UN is maximum
effective for wars lasting 10 years, and for short wars (where the original model says
the UN is most effective), the effects are not statistically significant. It is difﬁcult to
imagine how these divergent policy implications (all appearing in S&D’s Figure 1,
although without the conﬁdence interval for the original model) could reasonably
be described as unimportant.
6
Third, S&D argue that ‘‘the logit speciﬁcation inherently estimates interaction
effects.’’ Nagler (1991) showed this claim false long ago. Indeed, in S&D’s Figure 1,
the slight variability due to the logit form in the estimated effects from the original
model has nothing to do with the evidence in the data; if the two variables had a
stronger, weaker, or no interaction, that line would remain unchanged. The proper
way to estimate an interaction effect in logit models, as shown by Nagler, is to
include the interaction, an example of which is the modiﬁed model we ran, which
appears in the same graph.
Fourth, in their Figure 2, S&D apply our procedure to a different explanatory
variable that we did not examine and ﬁnd less model dependence than for mul-
tidimensional UN peacekeeping (as shown in our Figure 4). The only alternative
model they examined was the interaction with control variables, and when they
found less model dependence than we did, they concluded that our tests are in-
valid. This is fallacious reasoning. Testing only one alternative model does not
evaluate the conclusion of our test, which predicts that some alternative model, not
necessarily one with specific interaction terms, will give nonrobust results. In ad-
dition, their Figure 2 does offer examples of considerable model dependence,
the most dramatic of which is in the graph in the middle of their ﬁgure: where the
original model (on the vertical axis) gives a prediction of peacebuilding success
near.5, the modiﬁed model gives predictions that range all the way from about .05
to .95.
Fifth, they complain that we chose an extreme counterfactual where the UN
intervenes simultaneously in all the civil wars. As explained under the fourth point
in ‘‘Schrodt on Dinos,’’ we do not do this, but rather evaluate single counterfactuals,
each corresponding exactly to the observed data, except for the single value of the
UN variable in the one civil war of interest. The counterfactuals we evaluated
involved changing the treatment value and leaving the control variables at their real
observed values. S&D created other counterfactuals unnecessarily far from the data
by changing both the treatment and some of the control variables to hypothetical
values. They set some control variables to their observed values, some to their
means, and others to their 25th and 75th percentiles. Unfortunately, no civil war
has control variable values equal to the chosen hypothetical values. Indeed none
of their counterfactual controls is even within the convex hull of the observed
controls. In these practices, they missed an important point Morrow highlighted:
6 They also argue (in footnote 12) that the two models do not differ much as the correlation between the model
predictions ‘‘is large and positive at 68%.’’ To understand how irrelevant this correlation is, consider one model
predicting probabilities of .5 for the ﬁrst half of the data, .51 for the second half; another model predicting .01 for
the ﬁrst half and .99 for the last half. These drastically different predictions will have a correlation of exactly 1.
GARY KING AND LANGCHE ZENG 237‘‘I particularly like the subtlety of the observation that even when all the values of
the individual variables occur in the data, it may not be the case that all combin-
ations of those values do.’’
Finally, their comment puts forward random selection as a magic cure-all pro-
cedure for eliminating risks to inference and counterfactuals that result from
switching random treatment assignments as evidence of the absence of extrapo-
lation. Both claims are wrong. The beneﬁt of randomization is realized in any given
sample only as the sample size grows large. For a simple example, consider 10
subjects, differing greatly from one another on the explanatory variables, so that no
two are comparable. With these data, no random assignment would lead to com-
parability for reliable inference. Thus, randomization per se does not provide any
guarantee for counterfactuals to be close to the data, and should not be used as a
standard for counterfactual evaluation. Generally, the smaller the sample size, the
more the variables, and the more sparse the data, the more difﬁcult inferences will
be due to extrapolation, with randomization or not. But sufﬁcient experimental
control enables one to generate even small data sets that are well suited to making
inferences about given counterfactuals. All randomized data are not created equal;
all data sets of the same size are not equally informative. Our tests can be used to
sort out the good from the bad.
To shore up their fallacious assertions, S&D claimed to reanalyze a ‘‘good dataset
with experimental data’’ that has ‘‘more than 1,000 observations’’ from Hiscox
(2004). Unfortunately, the procedures described in their paper were not the ones
they used. Instead of using Hiscox’s full experimental data (a sample of 942 ob-
servations), as they claim, they used a nonrandom subsample of 562 observations,
and then entirely made up and added three variables of their own not in Hiscox’s
data, without discussing it in the paper.
7 When we replicated what S&D claimed to
have done, using Hiscox’s original data, we found 98.7 percent of the counterfac-
tuals to be inside the hull. Even a random sample of only 122 points from these data
has 78.7 percent of the counterfactuals inside the hull. Indeed, even a random
sample of just 22 points from these data has 50 percent of the counterfactuals
inside. Thus, not only do our tests indicate when sufﬁcient information exists to
evaluate counterfactuals in observational data, they can also be used to evaluate
experimental data. Hiscox’s original experimental data set was good; the version
S&D constructed was not.
Mathematical Claims
S&D make the general claim that our ‘‘diagnostic tools perform badly in small
datasets,’’ and that in data sets like theirs ‘‘with [122 observations and 11 variables],
no query point will be inside the convex hull’’ (S&D supplement., p. 126). This is a
strong claimFone that would be a stunning development given the extensive lit-
erature on convex hullsFbut constructing many counterexamples is easy, so the
claim is false. Each counterexample takes the form of a data set the size of their data
(or smaller) with 122 observations, one treatment variable, and 10 control variables
but, unlike their data, has as much as 100 percent of counterfactuals that fall within
the convex hull.
8 This proves that the convex hull check results reﬂect properties of
7 Hiscox also ran an experiment with a different treatment. Data from the two experiments total more than
1,000 observations but cannot be meaningfully combined for estimating treatment effects.
8 For a simple counterexample, consider 61 observations set to zeros for all variables except the ﬁrst three of the
UN (treatment) variable, which are ones, and 61 more observations for which control variables are ones and the UN
variable is one for the ﬁrst four observations and zero for the rest. Thus, the UN variable has seven ones and 115
zeros, just as in S&D’s data. The 122 counterfactuals that result from switching values of the UN variable (one at a
time) are all inside the convex hull. Indeed, even if n ¼ 10, all counterfactuals would still fall in the hull. We can also
use randomly generated data to produce as many counterexamples as desired, all with 100 percent of the coun-
terfactuals within the hull.
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tests are able to separate ‘‘good’’ small data sets (the n ¼ 122 random subsample of
Hiscox’s experimental data being a real example) from ‘‘bad’’ ones proves the
utility of our tests for small data as well. Thus, S&D’s claim that our program ‘‘does
not produce meaningful results’’ for small data sets like theirs is wrong.
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Second, S&D consider our Gower distance test and claim to ‘‘derive a mechanical
upper bound on the average number of data points that are ‘close’ to the coun-
terfactuals’’ as a function of ‘‘the relative number of binary treatments.’’ Their
supplement claims more specifically to ‘‘prove’’ that for any data set the same size as
their’s with a binary treatment, a counterfactual (created by switching the binary
treatment values) cannot be close to more than 11 percent of the observations (p.
133). They use this claimed mathematical result to argue that our geometric var-
iability threshold for closeness is unreasonable, and that the average of 1.3 percent
of observations we found close to their counterfactuals is not that small and that our
methods are not reliable. To prove that this second mathematical claim is false
requires only one counterexample. The simple example data set given in footnote 8
is sufﬁcient, as every counterfactual in those data has 50 percent of the data close by.
Indeed, it is easy to construct any number of counterexamples.
10
That these last two claims are false should not be a surprise. The convex hull
concept is not new; our innovation is an algorithm enabling scholars to apply this
venerable concept to data with as many variables as political scientists often have.
Similarly, although they have not been used for the purpose we propose, the Gower
distance was originally deﬁned over three decades ago and the geometric variability
over a decade ago, and they are known not to have the properties S&D attribute to
them.
Remaining Issues
We consider two remaining issues. First, S&D claim that ‘‘the easiest way to satisfy
King and Zeng’s convex hull test is to drop variables from the model, which will
bring more counterfactuals into the hull.’’ All our tests, and all counterfactual spe-
ciﬁcations, are conditional on chosen covariates. If the variables are wrong, the
counterfactuals and our tests can be wrong. Such is also the case with all estimates
from regression-like models. Dropping control variables, and inducing omitted
variable bias, is not advisable. The only valid way to drop relevant control variables
would be through procedures that make their values constant in the design phase,
such as in blocked experimental designs.
Second, S&D sometimes argue that their results should be taken as valid despite
insufﬁcient evidence or evidence to the contrary. For example, they write ‘‘Even if a
model fails a speciﬁcation test, this does not invalidate an empirical conclusion and
it certainly does not invalidate a model . . ..’’ Or, ‘‘Before we can reject an empirical
result, we need to design a more ﬂexible approach . . ..’’ Similarly, they also argue
that because an alternative model ‘‘cannot be estimated and parameter estimates
are incredibly distorted’’ the model must be wrong, but although inestimability
9 A related claim, that ‘‘every statistical method applied to multidimensional space will rely to some degree on
extrapolation,’’ is also wrong, as some counterfactuals do not extrapolate. They also claim ‘‘correlation among the
explanatory variables alone can take the ‘counterfactual’ outside the hull,’’ which is as it should be, as holding
constant one variable while changing a highly correlated one is unrealistic.
10 Distance distributions are determined by the data generating processes and vary across data sets. Some data
sets may see factual data points having little other data nearby. But in any given data, ‘‘good’’ counterfactuals should
have an amount of data nearby that are not too far from that for the factuals. In our simple example given above, the
50 percent of data near the counterfactuals is precisely the same as that for the factuals. In contrast, counterfactuals
far from the data will have much less data nearby than the factuals. Counterfactuals from Doyle and Sambanis
(2000) that we studied have only 1.3 percent of the data nearby; their observed data points have on average more
than 12 times as much data nearby.
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data. S&D explain, ‘‘We stand by our conclusions’’ because ‘‘we collected the data,
quantiﬁed difﬁcult concepts, learned about the cases, visited the countries, talked to
the policy makers, learned about the structure and politics of the United Nations,
and then applied currently available quantitative methods to analyze our question.’’
Every point in this list is an excellent reason to stand by a set of conclusions, except
the last. Using the best methods available in 2000 was a good reason to conclude in
2000 that they did everything possible. But the best methods for assessing model
dependence in 2007 suggest starkly different conclusions about the value of these
quantitative data. We take no position on whether this new information should
outweigh their qualitative evidence, but the burden of proof must remain with the
investigator.
Concluding Remarks
Valid inference about counterfactuals is essential for the key goals of social science,
including prediction, answering ‘‘what if’’ questions, and estimating causal effects.
When counterfactuals are posed too far from available data and lead to high de-
grees of model dependence, standard uncertainty measures such as standard er-
rors and conﬁdence intervals can often be massively underestimated. With model
dependence and analysts choosing a particular estimator based on any informal
rule they desire, formal statistical properties such as unbiasedness and consistency
cannot even be uniquely deﬁned, much less proved. Whereas previous methods to
assess model dependence usually required specifying and estimating many alter-
native models, and are thus subject to the criticism that some relevant alternative
speciﬁcations were missed, the checks we offer are not dependent on such choices
and so are valid for the set of all alternative models.
We thank our commenters and editors for the valuable opportunity to clarify the
results in our article, and to discuss many important related issues that have arisen.
With the methods we propose and accompanying easy-to-use software, and given
the impressive replication requirements of ISQ and other leading journals (King
1995; Gleditsch et al. 2003), researchers should now be able to more readily iden-
tify model dependence to improve their own work, to reanalyze data from existing
articles and reevaluate statistical results and conclusions, and to work together to
build new and more reliable social science scholarship we all wish to advance.
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